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Abstract
The function of legitimacy is to ensure voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises 
of governing authority. Since practically all European law needs to be implemented and 
enforced by the governments and courts of the member states, the EU does not have to 
face its citizens directly. It follows that the legitimacy of European governance ought to 
be conceptualized at two levels. At one level, the legitimacy of member states is decisive 
for the compliance of individuals and fi rms, regardless of the ultimate origin – interna-
tional, European or national – of the rules that demand this compliance. At the other 
level, the legitimacy of the European “government of governments” is decisive for the 
voluntary compliance of member states with the obligations imposed on them by the 
EU. What should be worrying however is the impact which EU governance – especially 
the rules of negative integration defi ned by politically non-accountable actors – may 
have on the legitimacy of member states, and ultimately on their capacity to comply.
Zusammenfassung
Legitimität hat die Funktion, die freiwillige Befolgung unwillkommener Autoritätsakte 
zu sichern. Da das Europarecht fast vollständig von den Mitgliedstaaten und ihren Ge-
richten umgesetzt und durchgesetzt werden muss, kommt es nicht zu einer unmittel-
baren Konfrontation der EU mit ihren Bürgern. Deshalb sollte auch die Legitimität des 
Regierens in Europa als Zweistufen-Konzept diskutiert werden. Auf der einen Ebene be-
stimmt die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten die Reaktion der Bürger auf unwillkommene 
Regeln oder Entscheidungen, ohne dass es dafür auf deren internationale, europäische 
oder nationale Herkunft ankäme. Dagegen entscheidet die Legitimität der EU als „go-
vernment of governments“ darüber, ob die Mitgliedstaaten ihrerseits ihre europäischen 
Verpfl ichtungen freiwillig erfüllen. Anlass zu Besorgnis gibt allenfalls die Rückwirkung 
des europäischen Regierens – insbesondere der von politisch nicht verantwortlichen 
Instanzen defi nierten negativen Integration – auf die Legitimität der Mitgliedstaaten 
und letztlich auf deren Fähigkeit zur loyalen Umsetzung europäischer Regeln.
4 MPIfG Working Paper 07/ 3
Contents
1 Democracy and multilevel polities 5
2 Legitimacy – functional, normative and empirical 6
3 Two normative implications 9
4 European constraints on the political legitimacy of member states 10
5 Negative integration and empirical legitimacy? 12
6 So what could be done? 16
References 17
Scharpf: Refl ections on Multilevel Legitimacy 5
1 Democracy and multilevel polities
Ever since I started out as a political scientist in the late 1960s, I have worked on issues 
of democratic legitimacy and multilevel government, off and on. But I never did focus 
systematically on the relationship between the two. In my work on multilevel policy-
making in German federalism, this relationship played only a marginal role – and I 
think for good reasons. In Germany, parliamentary democracy is institutionalized at 
both levels, national and regional. But German politics is so much focused on the na-
tional arena that Länder elections (which directly shape the party-political profi le of the 
federal second chamber) have mostly become “second order national elections” – with 
the consequence of increasing the pressures of democratic accountability on the na-
tional government. Political scientists, it is true, tend to worry about the lack of political 
transparency under conditions of the “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 1988), since the re-
sponsibility for national policy choices is shared among the federal majority and Länder 
prime ministers. But since dissatisfi ed voters are not obliged to be fair when they punish 
a government, blame avoidance is not a very promising strategy in German politics. So 
while I could talk about many things that are wrong with German federalism, a lack of 
political responsiveness to voter dissatisfaction would not be on my short list.
In my work on Europe, democratic legitimacy does indeed play a role (Scharpf 1999). 
I have no reason to retract anything that I have written on the subject – and I certainly 
will not bore you with a restatement. But I acknowledge that readers may have found 
my normative arguments somewhat inconclusive – and I tend to agree. The reason, I 
suggest, is that my arguments – in common with most of the literature – were focused 
on the European level, rather than on the implications of the multilevel characteristics 
of the European polity.
By focusing exclusively on the legitimacy of governing at the European level, we are 
tempted to refer to criteria that are also employed in defi ning the legitimacy of the 
democratic nation state. And once the issue is framed in these terms, we are inevitably 
involved in a comparative evaluation – which, depending on our meta-theoretical pref-
erences, can then be conducted in a critical or an affi rmative spirit.
In the critical mood, we will emphasize everything that European political structures 
and processes lack in comparison to (usually highly idealized) models of democratic 
constitutionalism at national levels (e.g., Greven/Pauly 2000; Follesdal/Hix 2006). The 
arguments, running from the fundamental to the more contingent, are too familiar to 
require elaboration: the lack of a European “demos” or of a “thick” collective identity, 
the lack of a common political space, the lack of a common language and of Europe-
wide media of political communication, the lack of a political infrastructure of Eu-
This paper was the keynote address on the occasion of receiving the “Award for Lifetime Achievement 
in the Field of European Union Studies” at the Tenth Biennial Conference of the European Union 
Studies Association on 18 May 2007 in Montreal, Canada. 
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rope-wide political parties, the absence of Europe-wide political competition, the low 
political salience of elections to the European Parliament, the limits of EP competen-
cies, and hence the lack of parliamentary or electoral accountability for European acts 
of government. In short, the European democratic defi cit exists and cannot be repaired 
in the foreseeable future.
In the affi rmative mood, by contrast, we will emphasize features where the EU compares 
favorably to a more realistic view of political structures and processes in real-existing 
member states (e.g., Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Institutional checks and balances 
at the European level are more elaborate and provide more protection against potential 
abuses of governing powers than is true in most member states. Moreover, many of the 
governing functions of the EU belong to a category which, even in the most democratic 
member states, is exempted from direct political accountability. On the other hand, 
explicitly political EU policies continue to depend on the agreement of democratically 
accountable national governments in the Council and on majorities in the increasingly 
powerful European Parliament. At the same time, EU institutions are likely to provide 
more open access to a wider plurality of organized interests than is true of most mem-
ber governments. In short, the alleged defi cit of democratic legitimacy exists mainly in 
the eyes of its academic beholders.
As you may have guessed: in my view, many of the arguments on either side have con-
siderable prima facie support in empirical and normative terms, but most of them are 
also vulnerable to empirical and normative challenges. Moreover, they are not generally 
in direct contradiction to each other, but tend to be located on different dimensions of 
a political property space – so that, even in the case of empirical agreement, the pluses 
and minuses could not be aggregated in a single evaluative metric. This may explain 
the ambivalence of my own arguments, and it surely must also affect the evaluation of 
EU legitimacy by other authors who are not committed ex ante to either a critical or an 
affi rmative position.
2 Legitimacy – functional, normative and empirical
What I now want to add to this reinterpretation is the intuition that the ambiguities 
could be reduced, though not overcome altogether, if discussions of political legitimacy 
in the European polity were explicitly located in a multilevel framework. To make my 
point, however, I also need to distinguish between three perspectives on political legiti-
macy – the functional, the normative, and the empirical.1
1 Hurrelmann (2007) also proposes a multilevel framework, and he also focuses on “normative” 
and “empirical legitimacy.” Since he pays no attention to the functional perspective, however, his 
operationalization of empirical legitimacy differs from mine. 
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In my view, the functional perspective is basic in the sense that it must also provide the 
reference for concepts of normative and empirical legitimacy. It addresses the funda-
mental problem of political systems – to fi nd acceptance for exercises of governing au-
thority that run counter to the interests or preferences of the governed (Luhmann 1969: 
27–37). Such acceptance may be motivated by an expectation of effective controls and 
sanctions or by widely shared (and hence socially stabilized) beliefs that imply a moral 
obligation to comply. Both motives may or may not coexist. But in political systems that 
cannot also count on voluntary compliance based on normative legitimating beliefs, 
effective government would depend entirely on extensive and very expensive behavior 
controls and sanctions, and perhaps also on the repression of dissent and opposition. 
In other words, legitimacy is a functional prerequisite of effi cient and liberal forms of 
government.
In the normative perspective, therefore, political philosophy and public discourses will 
propose and criticize arguments that could support an obligation to obey under condi-
tions where compliance would violate the actor’s interests and could be evaded at low 
costs. In modern, Western polities, such legitimating arguments tend to focus on insti-
tutional arrangements ensuring democratic participation, the accountability of gover-
nors, and safeguards against the abuses of governing powers.
From an empirical perspective, fi nally, what matters is the compliance with exercises of 
governing authority that is based on legitimating beliefs, rather than on threats and sanc-
tions. The focus of empirical research may thus be either on beliefs or directly on com-
pliance behavior. In both cases, however, empirical fi ndings will encounter problems of 
theoretical validity. In the fi rst case, the notoriously loose coupling of professed beliefs 
and actual behavior should make us hesitate to put too much weight on Eurobarometer 
data suggesting general support for, or trust in, EU and national institutions.2 By con-
trast, actual compliance behavior might be caused by the fear of effective sanctions as 
well as by strong legitimating beliefs. That would be less of a problem with data about 
non-sanctioned political behavior expressing greater or lesser support for governing 
authority. Thus, falling electoral participation rates, growing electoral volatility, more 
rapid government turnover, the rise of radical or system-critical political parties and an 
increasing incidence of violent protest could all be taken as valid indicators of declining 
political legitimacy. But since legitimacy should sustain actual compliance even in the 
absence of effective enforcement, one might also interpret increasing tax evasion, cor-
ruption and rising crime rates as indicators of declining political legitimacy.
If we now try to make use of these perspectives in evaluating political legitimacy in the 
multilevel European polity, it is clear that normative criteria can be discussed by refer-
ence to either the European or the national level. In the empirical perspective, however, 
2 Hurrelmann (2007) shares these reservations and relies on comments in the quality press in-
stead. This permits more differentiated analyses, but is even further removed from compliance. 
behavior.
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the situation is different. While public opinion data may include questions referring to 
both levels, the quality of the responses and their causal signifi cance remain dubious at 
best. Information on the behavioral indicators, by contrast, which would be of obvious 
causal relevance, seems to be available only for national polities. Worse yet, it seems 
practically impossible to defi ne behavioral patterns from which theoretically valid in-
ferences of the greater or lesser acceptance of the Union’s governing authority could be 
derived. Upon refl ection, the reason appears clear: the EU does not have to face the em-
pirical tests of political legitimacy because it is shielded from the behavioral responses 
of the governed by the specifi c multilevel characteristics of the European polity.
In contrast to federalism in the United States (where the national government has its 
own administrative and judicial infrastructure at regional and local levels), practically 
all EU policies must be implemented by the member states. Yet, unlike German federal-
ism (where most national legislation is implemented by the Länder and communes), 
political attention and political competition in Europe are not concentrated on the 
higher (i.e., European) level. European elections are not instrumentalized by political 
parties to shape European policy choices, and they are not perceived by disaffected vot-
ers as an opportunity to punish the EU government. In short, with very few exceptions 
(mainly where the Commission may prosecute business fi rms for a violation of compe-
tition rules), the EU does not have to confront the subjects of its governing authority, 
neither directly on the street nor indirectly at the ballot box.
Instead, it is national governments who must enact and enforce European legislation. 
In the BSE scare that had been badly mishandled by the EU (Vos 2000), it was they who 
had to slaughter and destroy hundreds of thousands of healthy cows when EU rules 
did not allow the export of meat from herds that were inoculated against BSE – and of 
course it was they who had to call out the police when protesters tried to block the mas-
sacre. As a consequence, two national ministers had to resign in reaction to rising voter 
dissatisfaction3 – just as national governments must generally pay the electoral price if 
voters are frustrated with the effects of EU rules on food standards, state aids, public 
procurement, service liberalization, takeover rules or university admissions.
By contrast, the EU is not directly affected either by an erosion of political support or 
by an erosion of voluntary compliance among the target population of its governing 
authority. Since that is so, it is essentially correct to say that, in relation to private citi-
zens, the empirical legitimacy of the EU’s governing authority depends entirely on the 
legitimacy resources of its member states.
3 See Imort (2001). Germany had committed to destroy 400 000 cows, but after violent protests 
by animal protection groups (and some recovery of the beef market) only 80 000 cows were 
ultimately killed. A play-by-play chronicle of the BSE crisis in Germany is provided in <www.
netdoktor.de/feature/bse/creutzfeldt_jakob_chronik.htm>.
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3 Two normative implications
From a normative perspective, this empirical conclusion has two major implications. 
The fi rst is that the legitimacy of the EU cannot, and need not, be judged by reference 
to criteria and institutional conditions that are appropriate for judging democratic na-
tion states. It is true, as EU lawyers do not cease to emphasize, that the direct effect of 
EU law has bestowed directly enforceable rights on fi rms and individuals – fi rst eco-
nomic rights and now even citizenship rights. Yet if the function of legitimacy is to 
motivate compliance with undesired obligations, what matters for the EU is the compli-
ance of governments, parliaments, administrative agencies and courts within member 
states – which, incidentally, has always been the focus of empirical compliance research, 
including the one that just received EUSA’s best book award (Falkner et al. 2005; see 
also, Börzel et al. 2007).
Empirically, therefore, the EU is best understood as a government of governments, rath-
er than a government of citizens. In that role, moreover, it is extremely dependent on 
voluntary compliance. Unlike national governments, which can and do reinforce nor-
mative obligations with the threat of effective and potentially very drastic enforcement 
measures, the EU has no enforcement machinery which it could employ against mem-
ber governments: no army, no police force, no jails – even the fi nes which the Court 
may impose in Treaty violation proceedings could not be collected against determined 
opposition.
If this is acknowledged, the normative discussion of EU legitimacy should also focus 
primarily on the relationship between the Union and its member states and on the 
normative arguments that could oblige their governments to comply with undesired 
EU rules. Now if the same question were asked in the German multilevel polity, a suf-
fi cient answer would point to the superior input legitimacy of political processes at the 
national level. Länder governments refusing to comply with federal legislation would 
thus violate the principles of popular sovereignty and representative democracy. Since 
the same answer could not be given for the EU, considerations of output legitimacy 
would necessarily have greater weight here.4
From the perspective of member governments it would thus be relevant to ask in what 
ways and to what extent membership of the European Union increases or reduces their 
capacity to ensure peace and security and to improve the welfare of the societies for 
which they are responsible. If national discourses on European legitimacy were framed 
in these terms, much of the present sense of malaise might evaporate.5
4 Hurrelmann (2007) found that evaluations of the EU in the German and British quality press 
also emphasized output-oriented criteria. 
5 On the crucial importance of national discourses on the EU for legitimacy at both levels, see 
Schmidt (2006, chapter 5).  
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My main concern, however, is with the second implication of the multilevel perspective 
on political legitimacy. If the Union depends so completely on its member states, then 
the potential effects of EU membership on their legitimacy should also have a place in 
normative analyses. These effects may be positive or negative. Most important among 
the positive effects is surely the maintenance of peaceful relations among European 
nations which, for centuries, had been mortal enemies. At the same time, European 
integration helped to stabilize the transition to democracy: fi rst in West Germany and 
perhaps also in Italy, then in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and then again in the Central 
and Eastern European accession states (Judt 2005).
More generally, one should think that the EU is strengthening the political legitimacy of 
its member states because it is dealing with problems that could no longer be resolved 
at national levels. While this argument has analytical merit, it is surprisingly diffi cult to 
substantiate empirically.6 In any case, moreover, it would need to be balanced against 
the possibility that many of the problems with which member states now must cope 
have been caused by European integration in the fi rst place, and that these may weaken 
political legitimacy at the national level (Bartolini 2005). It is these possibilities to which 
I will now turn.
4 European constraints on the political legitimacy of member states
There is no question that the EU is imposing tight constraints on the capacity for au-
tonomous political action on the part of its member states – in monetary policy, in 
fi scal policy, in economic policy and in an increasing range of other policy areas. But to 
think that these constraints could undermine political legitimacy at the national level 
still seems a surprising proposition. Given the central role of national governments, not 
only as “masters of the treaties” and as unanimous decision-makers in the second and 
third pillars, but also in legislation by the “Community Method” in the fi rst pillar, in 
Comitology and in the Open Method of Coordination, one ought to think that these 
constraints are mostly self-imposed, and probably for good economic and political rea-
sons (Garrett 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik/Sangiovanni 2003). In other words, vo-
lenti non fi t iniuria?
This is a fair argument as far as it goes. But it does not go very far for two reasons. First, 
the argument applies only to the “political modes” of EU policy making in which the 
6 There is reason to think that political legitimacy in relatively poor accession states has been 
strengthened by the high rates of economic growth that could be achieved through a combi-
nation of European subsidies with unconstrained tax and wage competition. By contrast, the 
economic benefi ts of integration for the Union as a whole appear much more doubtful (Ziltener 
2002; Bornschier et al. 2004). 
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governments of member states have a controlling role, but it does not apply to the “non-
political modes” in which the Commission, the Court and the Central Bank are able to 
impose policy choices without any involvement of member governments, or the Euro-
pean Parliament for that matter (Scharpf 2000). I will return to this in a moment.
Moreover, even for political choices, the argument holds only the fi rst time around, 
when the EU is writing on a clean slate. Here, unanimity or very high consensus re-
quirements will indeed prevent the adoption of policies that would violate politically 
salient interests in member states. And if no agreement is reached, national capabili-
ties – whatever they may amount to – will remain unimpaired. But once the slate is no 
longer clean, these same consensus requirements will lose their benign character. Now, 
existing EU rules – whether adopted by political or non-political modes – are extremely 
hard to amend in response to changed circumstances or changed political preferences. 
European law will thus remain in place even if many or most member states and a ma-
jority in Parliament would not now adopt it. This constraint may be felt most acutely by 
recent accession states who have had to accept the huge body of existing European law 
as a condition of their membership, and who have little or no hope of later changing 
those parts of the acquis that do not fi t their own conditions or preferences.
What matters even more here, however, is how the high consensus requirements of the 
political modes increase the autonomy and the power of EU policy making in the non-
political modes (Tsebelis 2002, chapter 10). In the case of the European Central Bank, it 
is true, the impotence of politically accountable actors was brought about intentionally 
(though perhaps unwisely) by the governments negotiating over the Monetary Union. 
The same cannot be said, however, for the non-political policy-making powers of the 
Commission and the Court.
Of course, the Court’s responsibility to interpret the law of the Treaty and secondary 
European law was also established intentionally, as were the Commission’s mandate to 
prosecute, and the Court’s powers to punish Treaty violations. What was not originally 
foreseen, however, was the boldness with which the Court would establish the doctrines 
claiming “direct effect” and “supremacy” for European law (DeWitte 1999; Alter 2001) 
– and how these would then allow it to enforce its specifi c interpretation of very general 
Treaty commitments. What also could not have been known in advance is how the po-
tential range of the Court’s powers of interpretation could be strategically exploited by 
the Commission if and when it chose to initiate Treaty violation proceedings against a 
member state – and how successful prosecutions against some governments would then 
be used to change the political balance in the Council in favor of directives proposed by 
the Commission which otherwise would not have been supported by a qualifi ed major-
ity (Schmidt 2000).
Moreover, the substantive range of judicial legislation is greatly extended by the fact 
that its exercise is practically immune to attempts at political correction. If the Court’s 
decision is based on an interpretation of the Treaty, it could only be overturned by an 
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amendment that must be ratifi ed in all twenty-seven member states. Given the extreme 
heterogeneity of national interests and political preferences, this is not an eventual-
ity that the Commission and the Court need worry about. Nor is the situation very 
different for interpretations of secondary EU law. In fact, the inevitable compromises 
between national interests favor vague and ambivalent formulations in EU regulations 
and directives that are effectively invitations to judicial specifi cation. Attempts at politi-
cal correction would then depend upon an initiative of the Commission and the sup-
port of qualifi ed majorities in the Council, and if the Council should wish to change 
the Commission’s proposal, it could only do so through a unanimous decision. As a 
consequence, the potential for judicial legislation is greater in the EU than under any 
national constitution.
5 Negative integration and empirical legitimacy?
But why should one think that the non-political powers of the Commission and the 
Court could interfere with the political legitimacy of EU member states? A general ar-
gument might point to the inevitable loss of national autonomy and control and the 
reduced domain of democratically accountable governing. Instead, I wish to present a 
narrower argument that focuses on a specifi c vulnerability of national political legiti-
macy to the rules of negative integration that are being promoted by judicial legisla-
tion.
On the fi rst point, I return to the distinction between normative and empirical perspec-
tives on legitimacy. In normative discourses, the focus is on the vertical relationship 
between governors and the governed. What matters are institutional arrangements en-
suring, on the one hand, responsive government and political accountability and pre-
venting, on the other, the abuse of governing powers through the protection of human 
rights and the rule of law. At the empirical level as well, trust in the effectiveness of these 
vertical safeguards must play a signifi cant role in legitimacy beliefs.
But that is not all. Voluntary compliance also has a horizontal dimension in which in-
dividual subjects will respond to perceptions of each other’s non-compliance. In game-
theoretic terms, this relationship can be modeled as an n-person prisoners’ dilemma, 
in which compliance must erode in response to information about unsanctioned non-
compliance (Rapoport 1970). This theoretical intuition is confi rmed both by empirical 
research on tax evasion (Levi 1988) and on the survival or decline of cooperative insti-
tutions (Ostrom 1990) and by experimental research (Fehr/Fischbacher 2002) – all of 
which demonstrate that voluntary compliance with rules, whether imposed or agreed 
upon, does indeed erode as a consequence of perceived non-compliance. Why should I 
remain law-abiding if others are allowed to get away scot-free? Hence we must assume 
that effective legitimating beliefs will also include expectations of a basic mutuality and 
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fairness among citizens and of a basic reciprocity between the consumption of public 
goods and the obligation to contribute to their production (Rothstein 1998). It is these 
expectations which are vulnerable to the removal of national boundaries through nega-
tive integration (Scharpf 1999, chapter 2).
Even in the original EEC Treaty, governments had signed sweeping commitments to 
negative economic integration. Customs duties and quantitative restrictions to free 
trade and “all measures having equivalent effect” were to be prohibited; obstacles to the 
free movement of persons, services and capital should be abolished; undistorted com-
petition in the internal market was to be ensured; and any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality was to be ruled out. In the original understanding, however, these were 
political commitments whose more precise meaning and reach would in due course be 
spelled out through further negotiations between governments and through political 
legislation at the European level – and whose consequences could be controlled through 
re-regulation at the European level.
Under the unanimity rule, however, political progress toward market integration was 
slow. Beginning in the early 1970s, therefore, the Court began to give direct effect to 
these Treaty commitments. But given the intrinsic limitations of judicial power, it could 
only strike down national regulations that impeded free trade and free movement; it 
could not itself re-regulate the underlying problems at the European level. The result-
ing asymmetry was only somewhat reduced when the Single European Act introduced 
the possibility of qualifi ed majority voting in the Council for regulations implement-
ing the Internal Market program. Where confl icts of interest among member states are 
politically salient, European regulations can still be blocked very easily, whereas judicial 
legislation continues to extend the reach of negative integration (Weiler 1999).
This asymmetry of negative and positive integration has effects that may undermine 
expectations of reciprocity at the national level. Now capital owners may evade or avoid 
income and inheritance taxes by moving their assets to Luxembourg; fi rms may relocate 
production to low-cost countries without reducing their access to home markets; local 
service providers may be replaced by competitors producing under the regulations and 
wages prevailing in their home country; national fi rms may avoid paying the “tax price” 
for their use of public infrastructure by creating fi nancing subsidiaries in member states 
with the lowest taxes on profi ts; and the latest series of ECJ decisions allows companies 
to evade national rules of corporate governance by creating a letter-box parent company 
in a low-regulation member state. Many of these examples – and the list could easily be 
extended – can be interpreted as a consequence of neo-liberal and free-trade economic 
preferences in the Internal Market and Competition directories of the Commission and 
on the Court (Gerber 1994; Höpner/Schäfer 2007).7
7 On the basic affi nity between multilevel governance and neo-liberal policy preferences, see 
Harmes (2006).
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But this motive alone can no longer explain the full range of Court-imposed rules of 
negative integration. A dramatic recent example is provided by a decision striking down, 
as discrimination on account of nationality, an Austrian regulation of admissions to 
medical education that had required applicants from abroad to show that they could 
also have been admitted in their home country (C-147/03, 20 January 2005). The Aus-
trian rule had tried to deal with the disproportionate infl ow of applications from Ger-
many, where admissions are restricted by stringent numerus clausus requirements – and 
when this was voided by the Court, the proportion of applicants from Germany rose to 
60 percent in some Austrian universities. In response, Austria passed a new rule limiting 
admissions from abroad to 25 percent of the total – against which the Commission again 
initiated Treaty violation proceedings that are presently on their way to the Court.
As an exercise in legal craftsmanship, the decision seems surprisingly weak: it is based 
on Article 12 of the EC Treaty – which, however, does not prohibit discrimination on 
grounds of nationality per se, but only “within the scope of application of this Treaty.” 
Yet nothing in the present Treaty (nor even in the draft Constitutional Treaty – Art. III – 
282) empowers the Union to regulate university admissions. Instead, Articles 3 and 149, 
to which the Court referred, merely authorize the Community to make “a contribution 
to education” (Art 3, 1 EC) and to “encourage mobility of students and teachers” (Art. 
149, 2 EC) – but with the explicit proviso that such actions should be limited to recom-
mendations by the Council and to “incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of 
the laws and regulations of member states” (Art. 149, 2 and 4 EC). In other words: the 
“masters of the treaty” have ruled out EU legislation that could regulate admissions to 
member states’ universities.
Moreover, these restrictions were explicitly introduced in the Maastricht Treaty to limit 
the expansion of the EU’s role in education. Yet the Court merely cited its own pre-
Maastricht precedent (193/83, 13 February 1985) that had had no textual basis in the 
Treaty, to assert that access to vocational education was within the scope of the Treaty. 
Apart from the arrogance with which political corrections of judicial legislation are 
ignored here, the decision appears remarkable for its completely one-sided concern 
with maximizing educational mobility and (in contrast to the legal situation among 
the American states) in ruling out any preference for residents of the country where the 
taxes are raised that fi nance higher education. This is like saying that the EU entitles you 
to claim access to a dues-fi nanced club even if you (or your family) are not assuming 
the burdens of membership. Similarly, there is no concern for the structural problems 
Austrian medical education and medical practice will face if half or more of the avail-
able places go to students from abroad that are most likely to leave the country after 
graduation.8
8 Apparently, Austria has a shortage of doctors as well as a perceived general need to expand its 
university education in spite of tight budget constraints. Having to introduce restrictive admis-
sions examinations, as the Court had suggested, in order to contain the fl ood of German ap-
plicants would thus be counterproductive.
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This is a remarkable position which, as I said, is not logically connected to the free-mar-
ket fundamentalism that may explain liberalization decisions in other areas. Instead, 
it must be seen as the expression of a more general pro-integration bias that treats 
any progress in mobility, non-discrimination and the removal of national obstacles to 
integration as an unmitigated good and an end in itself. In this regard, the case is by 
no means unique. As Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen has shown in a fascinating series of 
papers, the same pro-integration bias has also been driving the case law that is pro-
gressively removing the boundaries shielding national welfare systems.9 Its intensity 
is revealed by the variety of Treaty bases which the Court invoked to move forward in 
the same direction from one case to the next – relying sometimes on the protection of 
migrant workers, sometimes on the freedom of service provision, sometimes on non-
discrimination, and sometimes on the new chapter on “citizenship of the Union.” More-
over, when governments managed, by unanimous decision in the Council, to force the 
Court to retreat on one front, the ground was recovered a few years later by decisions 
relying on another Treaty base (Martinsen 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2007).
This quasi-unconditional preference for more integration through the removal of na-
tional boundaries has consistently characterized the policies proposed by the Commis-
sion and enacted by the Court. Their preference is widely shared by academic specialists 
in European law, who not only admire, and contribute to, the evolution of a largely 
autonomous legal system (Craig/Búrca 1999), but also praise the functional effective-
ness of “integration through law” under conditions where political integration has been 
weak (Weiler 1982; Cappelletti et al. 1985). Nearly the same admiration is evident in 
political science studies of the judicial edifi ce (Alter 2001; Stone Sweet 2004) and, more 
generally, in the way Europeanists in the social sciences view the “constitutionaliza-
tion” of the European polity – whether achieved through “stealth” and “subterfuge” or 
through explicit political action (Héritier 1999; Rittberger/Schimmelfennig 2006).
This pro-integration bias, I hasten to add, is most plausible and respectable, considering 
the horrors of our nationalistic pasts and the manifold benefi ts that we derive from the 
progress toward an “ever closer Union.” But as long as the asymmetry between political 
immobilism and judicial activism persists, progress is mainly achieved by non-political 
action, which – since the judicial power to destroy far exceeds its capacity to create – is 
bound to favor negative integration. The mere removal of national boundaries, how-
ever, is likely to deepen the divide between the mobile and the immobile classes in our 
societies, and between the benefi ciaries of integration and those who have to pay its 
costs in terms of unemployment, lower wages and higher taxes on the immobile seg-
ments of the tax base. If left unchecked, the split is dangerous for member states if it 
undermines the sense of mutuality and reciprocity at the empirical base of national le-
gitimacy. And it is dangerous for the Union if it weakens the willingness or the ability of 
member states to maintain the voluntary compliance on which the viability of Euro-
pean integration continues to depend.
9 See also the magisterial study by Maurizio Ferrera (2005), which, however, is surprisingly opti-
mistic about the possibility of a recreation of boundaries at the European level.
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6 So what could be done?
To summarize: a multilevel perspective on legitimacy in the European polity suggests 
a change of emphasis in current normative and empirical discussions. As long as the 
EU is able to rely on the voluntary compliance of its member states, the alleged Euro-
pean democratic defi cit loses much of its salience. Instead, the structural asymmetry 
between the immobilism of political modes of EU policy-making and the activism of 
non-political modes of EU policy-making appears more worrying. Moreover, there is 
a danger that the unrestrained pursuit of economic and legal integration may weaken 
the political legitimacy of member states and endanger the voluntary compliance of 
governments with EU rules that violate salient national interests.
But it is diffi cult to see how this danger might be avoided. There is apparently no way 
of persuading the Commission and the Court to use their non-controllable power in 
a more balanced way that would give more weight to the national problems that are 
created by the inexorable progress of negative integration. So, if judicial self-restraint 
cannot be counted upon, one should seek ways to increase the European capacity for 
political action. Given the high consensus requirements and the heterogeneity of na-
tional interests in EU 27, however, this seems a remote possibility. I am also deeply 
skeptical of proposals to invigorate the political modes of EU policy-making through 
political mobilization and the politicization of EU policy choices (Follesdal/Hix 2006; 
Zürn 2006). I agree with Stefano Bartolini (2005) that the most likely outcome, under 
present institutional rules, would be increased confl ict and even less capacity for politi-
cal action – as well as frustration and increased alienation among disappointed citizens. 
And, for reasons explained elsewhere (Scharpf 1999), I would be even more skeptical 
of institutional reforms that would reduce the veto power of the Council in favor of 
majority rule in the European Parliament.
Instead, one might think of creating a defense for politically salient national concerns 
that avoids the disruptive consequences of open non-compliance and that does not 
depend on the good will of the Commission and the Court. A while ago I suggested 
that this could be achieved through a form of politically controlled opt-outs (Scharpf 
2006). Member states could then ask the Council to be exempted, in a specifi c case, from 
a particular EU rule which in their view would violate highly salient national interests. 
I still think this would be a good idea: the Council could be counted upon to prevent 
opt-outs at the expense of other member states, but in the absence of signifi cant exter-
nalities it would also have more sympathy with the plight of a fellow government than 
could be expected from the Commission or the Court. At the same time, the prospect 
that one could later apply for an opt-out might facilitate agreement in the Council on 
new EU legislation and thus strengthen the political modes of EU policy-making. As far 
as I know, however, this idea has not found any takers.
So I must leave it at that. I certainly cannot say that I have a solution. Yet I am persuaded 
that there is indeed an important problem – on which, as we used to say, much research 
remains to be done.
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